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PEACE AND POWER SHARING IN AFRICA: A
NOT SO OBVIOUS RELATIONSHIP
ANDREAS MEHLER
ABSTRACT
Peace accords usually involve top politicians and military leaders, who
negotiate, sign, and/or benefit from an agreement. What is conspicuously
absent from such negotiations is broad-based participation by those who
should benefit in the first place: citizens. More specifically, the local level
of security provision and insecurity production is rarely taken into account.
The analysis of recent African peace agreements shows important varia-
tions in power-sharing devices and why it is important to ask who is sharing
power with whom. Experiences with power sharing are mixed and far less
positive than assumed by outside negotiators.
POWER SHARING LOOKS LIKE A LOGICAL APPROACH to sustainable conflict
management in multi-ethnic societies. In fact, it has been proposed time and
again and often inscribed in peace agreements. As Jarstad notes, ‘power
sharing is attractive to peace negotiators’.1 It might be less so for (all)
warring parties and the general population. Negotiators and signatories
may ignore and sideline security concerns of ordinary citizens, doing little
to address the underlying causes of conflict, and thus reducing the usefulness
of power sharing. It is also doubtful whether the power-sharing ingredients
of peace agreements are conducive to peace.
One problem of the current tendency to establish hasty power-sharing so-
lutions from the outside is the widespread popular perception that democ-
racy is thereby sacrificed in the name of peace. This problem is frequently
overlooked in specialized academic debates. In this contribution I first sum-
marize some relevant arguments in the academic debate on power sharing
and war termination. In a second step, I screen all recent major African
peace agreements (1999–2007) for their power-sharing content. Finally, I
analyse two country cases of peace agreements (Liberia and Coˆte d’Ivoire)
and one post-election crisis settlement (Kenya), all of which relied on power-
sharing ingredients. It will become obvious that power-sharing agreements
Andreas Mehler (mehler@giga-hamburg.de) is Director of the Institute of African Affairs at
the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg.
1. Anna Jarstad, ‘Power sharing for peace and democracy?’ (Paper presented at the 47th
annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, 22–25 March 2006),
p. 9.
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454 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
cannot provide sustainable solutions to all relevant aspects of complex crisis
situations, particularly those beyond a confined elite focus. Only intensely
debated and transitional power-sharing arrangements provide the expected
beneficial effects.
Sustainable peace by power sharing?
There is a large and growing body of literature on the causes of suc-
cessful conflict resolution. It would be impossible to give an account of all
arguments put forward and all the approaches followed in this field. Only a
selection of main works will be quoted for the sake of the argument: power
sharing is not uniform and has no uniformly positive effects on peace and
war, and that it ignores local security concerns.
Barbara Walter is a prominent supporter of power sharing. She posits that
the more power sharing is built into a peace agreement, the less international
commitment is needed to guarantee it.2 This belief in power sharing as a
miracle formula is not rare, but should lead to further questions. What is
meant by power sharing? Who has to share power with whom, and who
can still be excluded from the sharing arrangement? Those questions are
essential, for power sharing may be limited to only a few areas of governance;
or power may be shared only between the government and hand-picked rebel
groups; or radical movements, on the one hand, and civilian opposition
parties, on the other, may be left out.
Hoddie and Hartzell test provisions in the peace agreement – whether
implemented or not – as an independent variable for explaining the durabil-
ity of peace, and also distinguish between different levels of power sharing:
(1) central (political), (2) territorial (federalism/decentralization), (3) mil-
itary, and (4) economic power sharing. Consecutive hypotheses are for-
mulated and statistically tested. Their conclusion is positive while specific
with regard to the level of conflict escalation: ‘Power-sharing provisions in
peace settlements have a demonstrated ability to provide a sense of security
to former combatants facing the immediate prospect of working together
peacefully after a severe conflict such as a civil war.’3 But how could they
come to this conclusion without asking the combatants? They continue: ‘In
particular, our research indicates that both military and territorial power
sharing have a positive role to play in fostering post-war peace.’4 Political
2. Barbara Walter, ‘The critical barrier to civil war’, International Organization 51, 3 (1997),
pp. 335–64.
3. Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, ‘Power sharing in peace settlements: initiating the
transition from civil war’ in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds), Sustainable Peace:
Power and democracy after civil war (Cornell University Press, New York, NY, 2005), p. 103.
4. Ibid.
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power sharing, by far the most frequent version in Africa, does not have the
same value, according to Hoddie and Hartzell.
In a widely quoted article Stedman makes a case for focusing on so-
called spoilers as the most important barrier to the implementation of peace
agreements.5 While Stedman brings back in a number of issues of impor-
tance – such as actors’ interests and intents in the discussion – and therefore
is an important advocate of being less naı¨ve about peace processes, some
critical aspects of his work have to be noted. First, spoilers are always por-
trayed as the ‘bad guys’, stepping out of something that is perceived as good
– regardless of what harm it does to particular group interests. Second, we
have to remember that the spoilers of the peace process may have been sup-
porters of the previous democratization. And conversely, a rebel movement
that is accommodated by a peace process and is apparently sticking to the
provisions of the peace agreement may have been the spoiler during earlier
reforms. The spoiler perspective may hide more than it reveals.
Finally, Tull and Mehler argue that the institutionalization of the practice
of power sharing for the sake of ‘peace’ – that is, providing rebels with a
share of state power,
has important demonstration effects across the continent. It creates an incentive struc-
ture would-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgent path as well. As
a result, and irrespective of their effectiveness in any given case, power-sharing agree-
ments contribute to the reproduction of insurgent violence.6
Mediators may not even think in this long-term perspective. This may not
be entirely their fault, since the challenges they face can be immense. From a
diplomat’s point of view a bad agreement may be better than no agreement.
One key problem of the fire engine diplomacy that is so typical in Africa
is choosing mediation partners on the rebel side. In a context devoid of
peace, with perhaps a record of only manipulated elections over decades,
it is very difficult to know who can command the loyalty and legitimacy of
specific groups. A much more realistic assumption is that the self-declared
leaders and representatives of a neglected group are politico-military en-
trepreneurs without a genuine interest in representing anything beyond
themselves. They are usually involved in the negotiation because of their
spoiling capacities. Implicitly, they are also perceived as representatives of
5. Stephan John Stedman, ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’, International Security 22, 2
(1997), pp. 5–53.
6. Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler, ‘The hidden costs of power sharing: reproducing insur-
gent violence in Africa’, African Affairs 104, 416 (2005), p. 375. Tull and Mehler were criticized
by Rene´ Lemarchand (‘Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Affairs 106, 422 (2007), pp. 1–20) for allegedly
not wanting to take into account rebel organizations’ grievances, in particular those that were
excluded and had spoiling capacities. This was not our argument, as we primarily wanted to
show that peace agreements fail to take into account civilian opposition’s grievances, voiced in
peacetime, and end up sidelining those more constructive forces in peace negotiations.
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456 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ethnic groups, while those rarely form an undisputed entity. The outer limits
of these groups are in fact frequently disputed and the internal homogeneity
is a fiction.
This selective literature review shows that specification is imperative as
power sharing can take very different forms. It further questions whether un-
intended negative or ambiguous effects are systematically accounted for in
the academic literature. Over recent decades a number of peace settlements
were agreed upon in the name of preventive diplomacy whose sustainability
could have been doubted early on. Roeder and Rothchild count 22 com-
prehensive peace settlements in ethnically divided societies worldwide.7 In
some of those cases severe escalations happened in their aftermath (Rwanda
in 1993, Burundi in 1994, Sierra Leone in 1996, Afghanistan in 2001), in
others additional agreements were necessary to more or less stabilize the
situation (Burundi in 2001 and 2002, DRC in 2002 and 2003).8
Recent African peace agreements
In this light, it makes sense to review briefly those African peace agree-
ments established after Hoddie and Hartzell stop their calculation (1998)
and take only recent African cases before moving to our particular cases
in more detail (Liberia, Coˆte d’Ivoire, and Kenya). The following overview
(Table 1) is organized in a way intended to make the multi-dimensionality
of power-sharing dimensions visible.
This overview shows (1) that power sharing was a prominent aspect of
most recent African peace settlements,9 and (2) that there are important
variations in the form power sharing can take, confirming Hoddie and
Hartzell’s approach. Political and military power sharing is much more
frequent than territorial or economic power sharing. Even more striking is
(3) the variation in the important question of who is sharing power with
7. Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, p. 3. These peace settlements include Azerbaijan
(1991), Croatia (1991), Slovenia (1991), Eritrea (1993), South Africa (1993), Rwanda
(1993), Burundi (1994), Bosnia (1995), Sierra Leone (1996), Northern Ireland (1998),
Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Burundi (2001), Macedonia (2001–2), Burundi (2002),
Congo (2002), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2002), East Timor (2002), DRC
(2003), Coˆte d’Ivoire (2003), Iraq (2003), and Sudan (2004). Some gaps may be noted here
(Djibouti, 2000; Angola, 1991).
8. Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie , and Donald Rothchild, ‘Stabilizing the peace after
civil war: an investigation of some key variables’, International Organization 55, 1 (2001),
p. 195. They calculated that peace agreements on average lasted three and a half years before
conflict re-escalated.
9. The big exception is obviously the Casamance conflict between separatist rebels and the
central government of Senegal. Here, numerous peace agreements have failed to have any
sustainable effects, but maybe not because of the absence of power-sharing devices. Failure is
more probably linked to the amorphous nature of the MFDC rebel movement and the fact
that their historical leader Abbe´ Senghor (1928–2007) could not sign on behalf of the different
scattered wings.
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whom. Obviously, only those present at the negotiation table could really
count on being included. In many peace agreements the government and
individual rebel movements sign the final document, while civilian parties
and other actors are left out. This is then more often than not translated into
a power-sharing formula that excludes the non-signatories from the exercise
of power or gives them a disproportionately small share. Warring parties
are overrepresented in government. At times some coordinating positions
(for example, Prime Minister) are given to civilian parties or independent
candidates, but usually without the means to pursue independent policies.
What makes peace agreements successful? Only a few of the listed agree-
ments can be termed successes – the best bets are Burundi (2003), Liberia
(2003), Sudan (2005), and Coˆte d’Ivoire (2007). But does power sharing
a prominent role in explaining these successes? It is not clear. An elaborate
multidimensional power-sharing arrangement is not per se a success factor,
as Comoros (1999) and Coˆte d’Ivoire (2003) show. After all, peace is when
people think they are at peace. The perceptions of the population are the
best indicator of successful and failing peace settlements. But these data are
missing and are usually not available. One thing seems to be clear: superfi-
cial negotiations a` la Chad will not bring peace closer. In the case of Sierra
Leone, it was not the peace agreement and its power-sharing content, but
rather peace enforced by – mainly British – intervention forces that proved
the key to a late success.11 Another prominent example: the relative weight
for peace of the 2002 agreement in Angola is limited when compared to
the military defeat of UNITA rebels. Africa’s recent experience with power
sharing is far from a success story.
The picture gets clearer if we look in some detail at a small selection of
cases, which also permits us to see that power sharing is a dynamic process.
Liberia
The military stalemate in the first Liberian civil war formed the back-
ground of peace negotiations. After inconclusive agreements and meetings
in Cotonou, Benin (1993), Akosombo, Ghana (1994),12 and Accra, Ghana
(1995), a major breakthrough was recorded.13 In August 1995 the main
11. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (James Currey, Oxford, 2005),
p. 273; Michael Kargbo, British Foreign Policy and the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 1991–2001
(Lang, Bern, 2006), p. 320.
12. Akosombo included major power-sharing arrangements: Taylor, Kromah, and the com-
mander of the Armed Forces of Liberia, Hezekiah Bowen, should have become mem-
bers of a Council of State (five members). The text of the agreement can be accessed at
<www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_09121994.html> (29 December 2008). The agree-
ment was co-signed by Rawlings and a UN representative.
13. Dorina A. Bekoe, ‘Toward a theory of peace agreement implementation: the case of
Liberia’ in Rose M. Kadende-Kaiser and Paul J. Kaiser (eds), Phases of Conflict in Africa
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warring factions signed an agreement brokered by Ghana’s President Jerry
Rawlings in Abuja. Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), the strongest military organization, agreed to a ceasefire. A rul-
ing council of six members was formed, including three main warlords –
Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah of the Krahn faction of the United Libera-
tion Movement of Liberians for Democracy (ULIMO-K) and George Boley
of the Liberia Peace Council. Other factions were included in a government
that proved unable to run the affairs of the country effectively.14 However,
hostilities continued and were only stopped after a further agreement in
Abuja, Nigeria (1996).
Amos Sawyer, a prominent Liberian intellectual and former interim Pres-
ident, criticizes the peace settlements negotiated to end the violence in
Liberia (1996) and Sierra Leone (1998), particularly for their power-sharing
content.15 Both agreements established governments that were ‘substan-
tially, if not totally, controlled by armed groups whose leaders could hardly
find in such arrangements sufficient incentive to blunt their greed and
ambition’.16 Peace brokered this way was not sustainable. When Charles
Taylor won elections in 1997, partly through intimidation, he could con-
tinue his warlord politics as elected President. War broke out again in 1999
when a Guinea-backed rebel group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy (LURD) emerged. The rebellion was later joined by a second
military group, Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), operating
from Coˆte d’Ivoire.
The renewed civil war ended in 2003 with the LURD rebels close to
a military victory and the negotiated abandonment of power by Charles
Taylor (ceasefire agreement on 17 July 2003 in Accra). The three warring
parties plus 18 civilian party representatives met in Akosombo and Ac-
cra, from 4 June 2003 to 18 August 2003, within the framework of the
ECOWAS Peace Process for Liberia, under the auspices of Ghana’s Pres-
ident John Kufuor, chairman of ECOWAS, and under the mediation of
General Abdulsalami Abubakar, former head of state of Nigeria. The Accra
(de Sitter Publications, Toronto, 2005), p. 113, counts 16 peace and ceasefire agreements
between 1990 and 1997. She details all power-sharing arrangements and gives an inside view
of motivations of different armed factions to accept or refuse arrangements. She concludes that
the incremental steps taken by warring factions count most as they are seen as a concession
by the other parties, who may then match them (p. 131). This may explain the relative success
of the final Abuja arrangements.
14. Text available from <www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08191995.html> (29 De-
cember 2008).
15. Amos Sawyer, ‘Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: the case of
the Mano River basin area’, Journal of Modern African Studies 42, 3 (2004), p. 454.
16. Ibid., p. 451. Jarstad, ‘Power sharing for peace and democracy?’, p. 23, recalls that in
the case of Sierra Leone the Lome´ accord of 1999 simply reflected the enhanced bargaining
position of the RUF rebel group due to its military capacity. Consequently, the vice-presidency
was allotted to its leader, Foday Sankoh. Only in 2002 could the war be declared over.
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Agreement17 contained some obvious power-sharing arrangements. While
Taylor’s Vice-President, Moses Blah, was allowed to run government affairs
for a short period until October, the transitional institutions were clearly
designed according to power-sharing prerequisites. No representative of a
warring faction could hold the position of chairman or vice-chairman in the
National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). In the end the inde-
pendent businessman Gyude Bryant became head of the executive branch
of government. However, 15 out of 21 cabinet posts were allocated between
the two rebel movements and the former Taylor government – again, a
strong majority for the warring factions. The Taylor side retained internal
affairs, defence, planning and economic affairs, health and social welfare,
and post and telecommunications; LURD got transport, justice, labour and
finance, and the Ministry of State; MODEL would have agriculture, com-
merce, foreign affairs, public works and land, mines and energy. Taylor’s
Defence Minister was thereby allowed to continue in his job. In the legis-
lature some similar problems were encountered. The National Transitional
Legislative Assembly was composed of the three warring parties (12 seats
each), political parties (18), civil society and special interest groups (7), and
one representative each for the different counties (15). A disputed LURD
leader was made the interim speaker of the Legislative Assembly. This was
meant to be an interim arrangement, but it showed what the agreement
was all about: ‘That the persistent focus at Accra on jobs, cars and money
rather than the challenges confronting Liberia gives a clue to the character
of the transitional government.’18 The heavy involvement of peacekeepers
later permitted the rushing of national elections, to be held by the end of
2005, under a new constitution. Those elections permitted several key fig-
ures of Taylor’s regime and warlords like Prince Johnson to become elected
legislators – and thereby gain immunity. Taylor, by contrast, was indicted
by the UN-sponsored Special Court for Sierra Leone, and finally ended up
behind bars in The Hague.
On the military level the National Commission for Disarmament, Demo-
bilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration was formed, with all warring
parties contributing. The Accra Agreement determined that forces could be
drawn from the ranks of the then Government of Liberia forces, the LURD
and the MODEL, ‘as well as from civilians with appropriate background
and experience’. Economic power sharing, on the surface, was not the main
purpose of the Accra Agreement, but Article 25 noted:
Allocation of ministerial positions, deputy and assistant ministerial positions, head-
ship of autonomous agencies, commissions, public corporations and state-owned
17. <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_toc.html> (29 December
2008).
18. International Crisis Group, ‘Liberia: security challenges’ (International Crisis Group
Africa Report No. 71, Brussels, 3 November 2003), p. 4.
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enterprises shall be made to the Parties to this Agreement through a process of nego-
tiation. The allocations as agreed to by the Parties are contained in Annex 4 attached
to the Agreement. Annex 4 is an integral part of this Agreement.
Even more worrying than the distribution of political positions was the
decision to give each warring faction key public corporations, which would
allow them to siphon off state resources and thereby fund whatever they
pleased. This annex shared the spoils between the warring parties at a ratio
of four state corporations and two national agencies to each warring party.
The power sharing involved in the Accra Agreement has been heavily
criticized. In the view of Amos Sawyer, ‘fixing the central state is important
but insufficient. . .. Authority must be constitutionally shared at other levels
of government and local people must become empowered participants.’19
The security architecture proposed by Sawyer would be organized across
borders and involve, where appropriate, religious bodies and community
militia units. This seems plausible as numerous local-based ethnic disputes
have fuelled the civil war at the national level.
Liberia’s history of externally brokered agreements has plenty of power-
sharing devices involving the top level of warring parties. They may have
been partly conducive to peace at a secondary level, but the negative expe-
rience of the settlement of the first civil war raises doubts. Only the strong
and active presence of international peacekeepers – and not power sharing
during the transition period – achieved a respectable degree of stability and
security.20
Coˆte d’Ivoire
The list of negotiations and negotiators engaged to end Coˆte d’Ivoire’s
civil war is long. After a first round under the aegis of ECOWAS in 2002,21 a
complex attempt was made by the country’s former colonial power, France,
leading to the much-cited agreement of Linas Marcoussis (23 January
2003). Participants in the negotiation were all political parties represented
in Parliament or government, plus the three rebel organizations Mouvement
Patriotique de la Coˆte d’Ivoire (MPCI), Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du
Grand Ouest (MPIGO), and Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP).22
The agreement is a very interesting document as it addresses most of the
19. Sawyer, ‘Violent conflicts and governance challenges’, p. 454.
20. Festus Aboagye and Alhaji Bah, ‘Liberia at a crossroads: a preliminary look at the United
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians’ (ISS Paper 95, Institute
for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2004).
21. For an account of the ECOWAS negotiation attempts see ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on Coˆte d’Ivoire’ (UN Security Council, S/2003/374, 26 March 2003) p. 3ff.
22. MPIGO and MJP surfaced in late 2002 in the western part of the country; in 2003 they
merged with MPCI to become the so-called Forces Nouvelles.
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salient political problems of the country, including the question of citizen-
ship with its ramifications for electoral eligibility, human and civil rights,
and land ownership.23 There is no doubt that some of those solutions were
not wholeheartedly supported by all those who signed the agreement. But
the agreement failed because of (1) the role of France as a mediator and
(2) the power-sharing formula imposed shortly afterwards at the so-called
Kle´ber meeting in the French capital. It was simply unacceptable to Abidjan
(and particularly the army leadership) that the rebels should get the Defence
and the Interior portfolios, ministries that would give them preponderance
on all security issues. The preceding step, making the rebels presentable by
inviting them all to negotiations in Marcoussis, was already difficult to bear
for some regime hardliners, and indeed gave the rebels a political weight
they previously did not have. The presidential camp distanced itself im-
mediately from the agreement upon the delegation’s return, declaring the
text a simple draft needing refinement. Therefore, the whole agreement –
despite its interesting ingredients – had from the outset very poor prospects
of implementation. Some concrete details of the formation of a government
of national unity were left to a new summit in Accra (Ghana) on 7 March
2003, when the Forces Nouvelles got two senior ministries (Territorial Ad-
ministration and Communication). Additionally, a 15-strong National Se-
curity Council was established with all parties represented.24 This could
be interpreted as a second layer of power sharing (military establishment),
the first being the share of government positions. The consensual Prime
Minister Diarra was able to build a grand coalition including ten ministries
for the FPI, seven each for RDR and PDCI, while nine went to the rebel
union Forces Nouvelles plus six to smaller parties. A compromise was found
regarding the Interior and Defence ministries, which went to technocrats.
However, neither the National Security Council, nor the independent Prime
Minister, together with the handful of technocrats in government, were able
to influence government policy in key respects.
More popular concerns were not addressed. The country remained di-
vided and this division was frozen by the presence of UN, ECOWAS, and
French peacekeepers, although they were not able to prevent several erup-
tions of violence in the west of the country, the so-called confidence zone,
and in Abidjan over the following years.25 The territorial division was in no
23. All contained in an annex devoted to the programme of the Government of National
Reconciliation. A good analysis of the agreement can be found in Jessica Kohler, ‘From mirac-
ulous to disastrous: the crisis in the Coˆte d’Ivoire’ (Centre for Applied Studies in International
Negotiations, Geneva, August 2003), <http://www.casin.ch/web/pdf/cotedivoire.pdf> (29 De-
cember 2008).
24. <http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/cotedivoire/accra2.pdf> (29 December 2008).
25. Peacekeepers can claim a far less positive balance sheet than in Liberia; see Andreas
Mehler, ‘Positive, ambiguous or negative? Peacekeeping in the local security fabric’, Critical
Currents 5 (2008), pp. 41–65.
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way the result of a power-sharing agreement, but obviously mimicked some
effects that might have been gained from regional autonomy, as the northern
part was no longer under central administration. Even essential commercial
flows were controlled by a couple of rebel leaders for at least four years.
In the following period one camp did not agree to disarm, while the other
would not agree to change the constitution to allow for fair elections.
The interim agreements of Accra, on 30 July 2004 (in the name of
ECOWAS), as well as those mediated by South Africa’s President Thabo
Mbeki in the name of the African Union (Pretoria I + II, 6 April and 29
June 2005) could not resolve the deadlock. The signing of the Agreement
of Ouagadougou (4 March 2007) apparently created a much more viable
power-sharing arrangement.26 However, with all the previous failures, it
appears premature to be optimistic about long-term effects. What are the
main differences between the agreements of Linas-Marcoussis and Oua-
gadougou? The first peace plan was put on the table and pushed through in
about eight days. As good as the intentions may have been, it was rushed.
It lists important conditions for sustainable peace, such as the revision of
eligibility rules and the revision of land ownership, but the ‘implementa-
tion rules’, that is, the concrete power-sharing formula for a government
of national reconciliation in the following meeting, were not realistic. The
Agreement of Ouagadougou was signed by Gbagbo and Soro after a month
of intense negotiations (and still longer preparation) in what was called
‘direct dialogue’.27 The mediator, Blaise Compaore´, President of Burkina
Faso, himself the third signatory, is an ‘insider’ in contrast to the mediators
of all preceding agreements. Soro was appointed Prime Minister shortly
after the agreement and presented a new government.
The rapid ascension of a political entrepreneur from student leader to
rebel leader and now head of government therefore reinforced – in the
name of power sharing – the signal to other aspirant youth leaders that
‘violence pays’. Important questions remained unresolved: what to do with
local rebel commanders and militia leaders close to the President?28 How
to dismantle the entrenched war economy in both north and south? What
about the local theatres of violence over the last couple of years? And how
to deal with the deep mutual distrust inside the population? While Linas-
Marcoussis singled out more root causes of the armed conflict, it looked
less realistic than the Ouagadougou agreement that more clearly paid off
26. French text of the agreement from <www.soirinfo.com/article.php3?id_article=3631>
12 May 2009.
27. Background reports can be found in Jeune Afrique, 11–17 March 2007, 25–31 March
2007. See also Le Monde, 13 March 2007.
28. See Jeune Afrique, 20–26 May 2007; Africa Research Bulletin, 1–30 June 2007, pp. 17–122;
Marche´s Tropicaux et Me´diterrane´ens, 6 July 2007, p. 48.
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for rebel leader Soro. More people believed that this agreement could bring
peace nearer. Here the process mattered more than the content.
Kenya
Kenya might be termed an atypical case, as the agreement reached was
not called a peace agreement (and therefore is not included in Table 1)
and the deadly clashes, with over a thousand deaths, were not described
as a civil war. On 27 December 2007, the second presidential and parlia-
mentary elections in the post-Moi era were held. Raila Odinga’s Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) won 99 out of 210 parliamentary seats,
while the Party of National Unity (PNU), led by President Mwai Kibaki,
won only 43 seats. However, Kibaki was declared winner of the presidential
elections. According to the official figures he held an advantage of 3 percent
over his opponent Odinga.29 The ODM, in line with international election
observers, claimed fraud. Violent riots swept across Kenya after the an-
nouncement of the election results.30 Only two out of eight provinces were
spared, but the local conflict scenarios varied strongly. Rift Valley, Nyanza,
Western Province and Nairobi were most seriously affected. Around 1.200
people died and officially 350,000 were displaced before a power-sharing
agreement was signed between Kibaki and Odinga on 28 February 2008.
Several attempts at mediation were made after the outbreak of hostilities
in early January 2008. The most prominent was by John Kufuor, Ghana’s
President and outgoing Chairperson of the African Union. However,
Kufuor failed to arrange a meeting between Kibaki and Odinga. On 25
January, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan brokered face-to-face
negotiations between the rivals. Annan mediated in the name of the African
Union’s Panel of Eminent Africans. Benjamin Mkapa (former President
of Tanzania) and Grac¸a Machel (wife of Nelson Mandela) had oversight
roles, while the Kibaki camp rejected – for alleged links to Odinga – the
participation as a chief negotiator of South African business tycoon Cyril
Ramaphosa, who had played a lead role in negotiating the end of apartheid
in South Africa.31 Tanzanian President and new AU chairman Jakaya
29. <http://www.communication.go.ke/elections/default.asp> (29 December 2008). ODM
officially recorded 47.1 percent of the votes at the legislative elections (PNU 20.5), but Odinga
just 44 percent at the presidential contest (Kibaki 47, the third candidate Kalonzo 9).
30. Recent analyses have attributed the post-electoral violence to a large extent to elite
fragmentation and elite struggles; see Gabrielle Lynch,’Courting the Kalenjin: the failure
of dynasticism and the strength of the ODM wave in Kenya’s Rift Valley Province’, African
Affairs 107, 429 (2008), pp. 541–68; and Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman,‘Democratization,
sequencing, and state failure in Africa: lessons from Kenya’, African Affairs 108, 430 (2009),
pp. 1–26.
31. The Guardian, ‘Kenya government forces out key mediator in political talks’, 4 February
2008, <http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/04/kenya.xanrice> (29 December 2008).
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Kikwete joined the mediation team at a critical moment on 26 February.32
Negotiations between the Kibaki and Odinga camps lasted for nearly 40
days. Each of the contestants appointed a four-person negotiating team of
high-ranking party officials. Outside pressure to come to a quick solution
was high. Donors threatened to withdraw their assistance, while the pow-
erful Kenyan tourism industry and Kenya Association of Manufacturers
pushed for a solution to the crisis. A number of intermediate agreements
were signed on 1, 4, and 14 February.
The final agreement signed by Kibaki and Odinga is a short document,
which contains the essentials of the power-sharing deal: The PNU and the
ODM should form a government of national unity, a grand coalition. The
composition of the Cabinet should reflect the parliamentary strength of
the coalition members. The post of Prime Minister was newly created. And
the leader of the largest party or the governing coalition in the National
Assembly was to be named Prime Minister and as such authorized to coor-
dinate and supervise the execution of the functions and affairs of the govern-
ment. Odinga thus became Prime Minister. Concomitantly, there would be
two deputy prime ministers, one from each member of the coalition. Fur-
thermore, the contestants signed several side agreements to establish sepa-
rate commissions:33 a Constitutional Review Commission; a Commission
of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) to investigate the violence
that took place after the poll; a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (TJRC); and an Independent Review Commission (IREC) to examine
long-standing sources of grievance. On 18 March 2008 the Kenyan Parlia-
ment unanimously passed the key pieces of the settlement: The National
Accord and Reconciliation Bill (which outlines the concept of power shar-
ing) and a Constitutional Amendment Bill (which creates the post of the
Prime Minister and of the two deputy prime ministers).
The core document had several flaws. Most importantly, it fell short of
specifying the functions of the Prime Minister. Thus it was no surprise that
neither camp could agree on their roles in the following months. In several
instances, Kibaki proved reluctant to cede government authority to Odinga.
The concrete formation of a government was not included in the text of the
agreement. As a consequence, on 8 April the announcement of the suspen-
sion of the talks over the coalition Cabinet’s composition resulted in violence
in Kibera, a Nairobi slum. Further sporadic use of violence by armed mili-
tias was recorded after the signing.34 The character of the agreement was an
32. Pambazuka News, ‘How Annan magic worked to seal Kibaki-Raila deal’ <http://www.
pambazuka.org/actionalerts/comments/annan_magic_kenya_deal/> (29 December 2008).
33. For the text of the agreements, see <http://rescuekenya.wordpress.com/annan-
agreements-gvt-odm/> (29 December 2008).
34. United States Institute of Peace, ‘Kenya: setting the stage for durable peace?’
(United States Institute of Peace, April 2008), <http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/
2008/0415_kenya.html> (29 December 2008).
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elite pact. The AU was in fact criticized for not ‘reaching out to civil society
organizations’ 35 during the mediation of the agreement. This was however
remedied to some extent by the serious work of the CIPEV, calling upon
non-governmental organizations (among others) to ‘provide information to
the Commission of Inquiry related to post-election violence’.36 The agree-
ment itself focused on institutional engineering, and failed to address root
causes of conflict such as land tenure and human rights abuses. Some of this
work was left to the different commissions created. The CIPEV report was
published on 15 October 2008 and detailed responsibilities for the violence
on both the government and the ODM side – without naming names.37
It may prove to be a basis for more meaningful peace arrangements at the
local level.
Conclusion
Power-sharing agreements offer no miraculous solutions to complex crisis
situations. Further evidence is provided by the Zimbabwean case, where an
uneasy process continued at the time of writing. A power-sharing agreement
was signed on 15 September 2008 between the ruling Zimbabwe African
National Union/Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) formations. The agreement was meant to end
a severe crisis after the contested first round of presidential elections in
March 2008. The key element of the deal, mediated by South Africa’s for-
mer President Thabo Mbeki, was a government of national unity. According
to the agreement the executive powers would be shared between the two
main protagonists: Robert Mugabe, winner of a meaningless second round
of elections, would remain President of Zimbabwe and head the Cabinet,
whilst Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the main opposition faction who had
refused to participate in the second round citing security concerns, was des-
ignated as Prime Minister and would chair a council of ministers supervising
the Cabinet. Arthur Mutambara, leader of the second MDC faction, would
be appointed Deputy Prime Minister.38 The government would comprise
thirty-one ministers, 15 nominated by ZANU-PF, 13 by MDC-T and 3 by
MDC-M. Quarrels started anew immediately after the signing of the deal on
the concrete distribution of key ministries, not least in the security sphere.
Although this is a crucial aspect, it was striking that the contenders were
35. Ibid.
36. <http://rescuekenya.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/commission-of-inquiry-violence-4-
march-2008.pdf>, (29 December 2008), p. 2.
37. <http://www.communication.go.ke/Documents/CIPEV_FINAL_REPORT.pdf> (29
December 2008).
38. <http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/documents/agreement091508.pdf> (29 December
2008).
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focusing again on predominantly elite concerns. From the beginning this
point had been criticized in the public debate. Among others, the Congress
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), through its spokesman Patrick
Craven, termed the agreement an ‘elite deal negotiated between a few indi-
viduals, with no attempt to involve civil society’.39 The Zimbabwe Congress
of Trade Union (ZCTU) noted in its deliberations that ‘the process used
in coming up with the deal was not all-inclusive as the civic society was not
given an opportunity to participate’.40 Wafulu Okumu, head of the African
Security Analysis Programme at the Pretoria-based Institute for Security
Studies, pointed out that in the case of Zimbabwe, as well as in Kenya, a
debate has to be started about whether ‘democracy is being sacrificed for
peace, just like it has been pointed out that justice has been sacrificed for
peace in Uganda and Sudan’.41
Power sharing remains in vogue despite such unresolved issues. Examin-
ing a full sample of recent African cases (1999–2008) shows that at least
some power-sharing devices are present in most peace agreements in Africa,
successful or not, while the specific aspects (political, military, territorial,
economic) can vary. The lion’s share of top positions in power-sharing
governments routinely goes to the groups represented at the negotiation
table – and those are mostly the warring parties.
More specific lessons can be drawn from individual cases examined. In the
Ivorian case, the Linas-Marcoussis (2003) and Ouagadougou agreements
(2007) gave very different signals, although the latter agreement is formally
based on the former. While Linas-Marcoussis singled out root causes of the
armed conflict, it looked less realistic than the Ouagadougou agreement,
that more clearly paid off for rebel leader Soro. More people believed that
this agreement could bring peace nearer. The negotiation process and its
participants mattered more than the content. Liberia’s history of externally
brokered agreements, including the 2003 Accra agreement, is studded with
power-sharing devices involving the top level of warring parties.42 Some
of the provisions are very detailed and handed sinecures to former rebel
leaders, much to the anger of civilian leaders. However, it was the strong and
active presence of international peacekeepers – and not the power sharing
formula enacted during the transition period – that achieved a respectable
degree of stability and security. The Kenyan power-sharing deal was never
said to be part of a peace agreement. The text itself and its interpretation
show all the difficulties inherent in vague formulations. The major difference
39. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=80623> (29 December 2008).
40. Links, ‘Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions: power-sharing deal “a far cry” from ex-
pectations’, <http://links.org.au/node/635> (29 December 2008).
41. <http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/
ZIMSEMREPSEP08.PDF?link_id=14 &slink_id=6608&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl
_id=3> (29 December 2008).
42. Sawyer, ‘Violent conflicts and governance challenges’.
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between this and many other negotiation processes lies in the potential
effectiveness of side aspects of such a deal, in this case the creation of diverse
commissions who would dig deeper over a substantially longer period of time
and propose more differentiated solutions.
Although cases differ in the form conflict and civil war has taken, there
is one striking commonality in most recent African peace agreements: the
readiness of the international community to advocate or facilitate a strong
power-sharing ingredient, which is to the benefit of armed rebel movements
(or their leaders). This seems not to be a function of the strength of interna-
tional engagement, as power sharing could be a cheap solution (for example,
in the Central African Republic) or a rather expensive and transitional one
(in Liberia). In Coˆte d’Ivoire and many other places (DRC, CAR, Chad)
civilian political parties have suffered a setback not only because of war, but
also because of the way peace was negotiated – from outside and above.
In examining more closely the realities in the three cases of Liberia, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, and Kenya, it becomes clear that there are even more aspects of
power sharing that need attention and which would profit from a ‘large-N’
examination – beyond the African cases. But the argument of this article
also invites researchers to provide more in-depth case studies, as variations
are so important. First we need to investigate who is defining the constitu-
tive parts of the polity. Then, what are the ‘ethnic’ groups which supposedly
need accommodation?43 Who is entitled to speak for such a community?
And, above all, who is invited to the negotiation table? After all, this analysis
shows the carelessness of outside actors when deciding upon those issues,
either by inviting pre-war political formations with unclear popular creden-
tials or, even more frequently, by bringing in vociferous political-military
entrepreneurs and rebel organizations with one main quality: spoiling capac-
ities. An effort to ask communities about their sense of the problems and the
legitimacy of those sitting at the negotiation table, sometimes explicitly in
their name, cannot be detected. This is only different when contested elec-
tions are the triggers of conflict escalation, as in Kenya (and Zimbabwe).
The second problematic aspect of the settlement practice is the system-
atic assumption that the conflict is ethno-political in nature (particularly
when it comes to Africa). While Burundi’s civil war has an obvious ethnic
colouration and significance, this is much more difficult to assert in cases
such as Comoros or the Central African Republic. Third, the local level not
only of (1) conflict generation and (2) escalation, but also of (3) conflict
management and (4) security production is more often than not completely
neglected in peace negotiations. In such cases, it cannot be denied that na-
tional power sharing will fail to bring a solution at the local level and may
43. Walker Connor, ‘A few cautionary notes on the history and future of ethnonational
conflicts’ in Andreas Wimmer et al. (eds),Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a new realism (Rowman
and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2004), pp. 23–33.
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even impede local solutions to problems that were at the root of an armed
conflict. Fourth, the perceptions of the population as to whether there is/was
a violent conflict and whether it was interrupted, terminated, or settled (or
whether it continues) are obviously important, not least for the decision of
whether a peace settlement was successful. But this issue is rarely analysed,
so we are devoid of reliable data.
Therefore, the entire discussion about power sharing and sustainable
peace looks inherently flawed when it does not focus on what peace is all
about: security for the people. Local sustainability might also be the real test
of one of the most recent major power-sharing agreement on the continent:
In Kenya, no single provision touches on the local level of security provision,
for example, in the hardest-hit zones of violence in Rift Valley, Kisumu and
some poor neighbourhoods of the capital, Nairobi.44 This may turn out to
be problematic. After all, only tailor-made, intensely debated, and maybe
only transitional power-sharing arrangements can have beneficial effects.
Such effects will by no means automatically arrive when a peace agreement
has been signed; good intentions alone do not provide for peace.
44. See the text of the final parliament-endorsed agreement <http://www.kenyalaw.org/
Downloads/Bills/THE%20NATIONAL%20ACCORD%20AND%20RECONCILIATION
%20BILl,%202008.pdf> (29 December 2008).
 at G
IG
A
 G
erm
an Institute of G
lobal and A
rea Studies. Leibniz Institut fuer G
lo on February 7, 2014
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
